The Mismanagement of Global Imbalances: Why Did Multilateralism Fail?
After all major financial crises, debates about their causes generally continue without resolution for years and even decades. The aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-9 is unlikely to be an exception to this rule. As one example, the debate over whether and how much persistent large imbalances in international trade and financial flows contributed to the unsustainable boom that preceded the crisis continues. 1 In this chapter, I largely leave aside the question of whether global imbalances were an important cause of the crisis, although I argue that the lack of agreement on this issue is one factor -but not the most important -contributing to the continuing inability of governments to take measures that would substantially reduce them. One reason for setting aside the debate about the role of global imbalances in causing the crisis is that even if one took the view that they played little role in producing the crisis, there are a variety of other reasons why they should remain high on the agenda of global economic governance. Not least, continuing large payments imbalances raise concerns about the consequences of the growing net indebtedness of the United States, of the continued accumulation of US dollar-denominated government debt by China, and further complicate the already problematic relationship between Washington and Beijing. 2 In many ways, the ability of these two countries and of the institutions of global economic governance more generally to manage the problem of global imbalances can be seen as a litmus test of contemporary multilateralism. Before the crisis, the major countries categorically failed this test. Indeed, the G-20 seemed to accept this in agreeing at the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009 that they had a collective "responsibility to ensure 3 sound macroeconomic policies that serve long-term economic objectives and help avoid unsustainable global imbalances." 3 Despite the renewed impetus provided by the crisis, however, I argue that the likelihood of them achieving their commitment remains low.
What explains this longstanding failure of multilateralism in such a crucial area of global economic governance? One possible reason is the perennial failure within economics and the economic policy community significantly to explore, let alone to understand, the linkages between macroeconomic and financial sector imbalances. 4 With the benefit of hindsight, this weakness played a part in the partial misdiagnosis of the global imbalances problem and its associated focus on the sustainability of net lending by surplus countries to the US. But this intellectual failure cannot fully explain the continued lack of political progress in the aftermath of the crisis, given the heightened attention to macroeconomic-financial linkages. Even before the crisis, conventional analysis implied some fairly frightening possible outcomes, including a collapse of the dollar, rising US interest rates, rising protectionism, and a deep global recession. 5 Such outcomes were sufficiently plausible to policymakers that the major countries conducted a series of bilateral and multilateral policy negotiations to reduce global imbalances after 2004.
These efforts went nowhere, suggesting that the failure of multilateralism in this area is not mainly due to the absence of an agreed diagnostic framework.
A second possible explanation for the failure of multilateralism is that the sources of global imbalances increasingly lay in policy choices made outside of the G7 countries, undermining the ability of this key grouping to address the problem. This explanation is less easy to dismiss, in part because it points to an obvious truth (the shift in the balance of economic power away from the G7) and because it links macroeconomic imbalances 4 to financial instability. Multilateralism has failed to manage global imbalances, I suggest, for two other related and deeply political reasons. First, it stemmed from a persistent unwillingness among all major countries, not just China, to accept the domestic political costs of adjustment and a related shift to different models of economic growth. I argue below that
China is indeed an outlier among the G-4 (consisting of the US, EU, Japan, and China), but only because it is relatively poor, unusually open, and has opted for exchange rate targeting rather than inflation targeting. It does indeed resist external policy constraint, but in this regard it is little different to other major countries. Second, it stemmed from the weakness of the multilateral policy surveillance framework inherited from the era of western dominance. This framework was poorly suited to facilitate the negotiation of the necessary domestic and international political bargains, particularly as regards policy areas that the major countries viewed as too politically sensitive. In order for multilateralism to become more effective in the future, these flaws would need to be resolved, but there are few signs that major governments will accept the constraints on domestic policy choices that this requires.
The rest of this chapter proceeds by placing the recent failure of the global institutional framework to manage global imbalances effectively in a broader historical China is not the 'critical test' of multilateralism that it is often seen to be. The conclusion assesses the potential for recent changes in the shape of global economic governance to make multilateralism more effective in this area in the future.
1 The multilateral framework for macroeconomic policy coordination
Under the Bretton Woods rules as agreed in 1944, the main focus of multilateral policy constraint was firmly on member countries' exchange rate policies, not fiscal and monetary policies. Reflecting the negative interwar experience with floating exchange rates, countries were obliged to avoid beggar-thy-neighbour exchange rate policies and to consult with the Fund on any significant change in their currency's par value. This focus was retained after the breakdown of the pegged exchange rate system in the early 1970s, when the major countries agreed to expand some aspects of the IMF's macroeconomic policy surveillance function. These modifications were driven primarily by the US concern that major surplus countries, particularly West Germany and Japan, were continuing to resist the appreciation of their currencies that Washington saw as necessary to reduce growing global payments imbalances.
The Second Amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement (1977) modified Article IV to give the IMF responsibility to oversee the international monetary system to ensure its effective operation ("multilateral surveillance") and to monitor each member country's compliance with its policy obligations ("bilateral surveillance"). The amendment specified that "The Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies." The Second Amendment also obliged IMF members not to "manipulate" their exchange rate: "A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members." 9 However, this clause was rather general and implied the need to demonstrate intent on the part of the country to gain an unfair advantage.
Pauly argues that these revisions reflected a persistent underlying norm that countries were mutually responsible for the external effects of their macroeconomic policy choices. 10 But the regime was narrower than this, since the formal rules continued to focus almost entirely on exchange rates. Member countries had no obligation to coordinate their fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal policy choices have never been constrained by this multilateral regime, a reflection of the domestic political sensitivity of taxation and spending decisions. Under the pegged exchange rate system, countries were free to adopt capital controls precisely in order to permit them to make independent monetary policy choices. The country at the centre of the pegged exchange rate system, 
In June 2007, the IMF's Executive Board approved its Decision on Bilateral
Surveillance which specified that the Fund should focus on the extent to which each member country's policies were consistent with "external stability." This was defined as "a balance of payments position that does not, and is not likely to, give rise to disruptive exchange rate movements." 14 The Decision elaborated that "exchange rate policies will 11 always be the subject of the Fund's bilateral surveillance with respect to each member, as will monetary, fiscal, and financial sector policies" (Ibid: I.A.5). However, it was primarily exchange rate obligations that were tightened; in fact, the Decision explicitly stated that "the Fund will not require a member that is complying with Article IV, Sections 1(i) and (ii) to change its domestic policies in the interests of external stability." 15 As for exchange rate obligations, the Decision specified that a member would be "acting inconsistently with Article IV, Section 1 (iii)," if the Fund determined it was both engaging in policies that are targeted at -and actually affect -the level of the exchange rate, which could mean either causing the exchange rate to move or preventing it from moving; and doing so "for the purpose of securing fundamental exchange rate misalignment in the form of an undervalued exchange rate" in order "to increase net exports." Beijing's view, unsurprisingly, was different, seeing the Decision as targeted at and stigmatizing China and in an unusual step it voted against the proposal.
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In summary, multilateral rules on macroeconomic policy have always focused primarily on currency policy and have become progressively stronger in their implied prohibition on currency "manipulation," but do not and are not intended seriously to constrain national monetary and fiscal policy autonomy. This asymmetry is largely consistent with the preferences of the governments of the major developed countries who still dominate the IMF's Executive Board and thus reflects power, or the legacy of past power, in the global political economy. Given the continuing rise in capital mobility since the 1970s, the regime therefore also favours those countries and blocs who in most circumstances prefer macroeconomic policy autonomy to exchange rate targeting -that is, the US, EU and, to a lesser extent, Japan. By contrast, the revealed preference of many emerging and developing countries is for exchange rate targeting -presumably because of their increasing focus on ensuring export growth as a key source of development. 18 This puts them at much greater risk of falling foul of existing multilateral rules. This is especially true for China given its unusual size and importance in the global political economy. There is some support for these criticisms. In a speech to the US Chamber of Even so, it is not obvious that Beijing rejects the right of the IMF to exercise surveillance over member states' policies. 26 The main point of resistance has been more one of timing. There was no rejection of the principle of IMF surveillance or even of the rule on currency manipulation in the public documents released in the IMF's bilateral surveillance consultations with Beijing, 27 and in negotiations with both the IMF and US, Chinese technocrats have accepted that currency reform is necessary but argued for a cautious, gradual approach. 28 China's stance was similar in the IMF-sponsored multilateral negotiations on global imbalances that were conducted between the major countries over 2006-7. Rather than rejecting the multilateral regime altogether, then, Beijing has insisted on its right to maintain sovereignty over the pace at which China implements such policy advice -another point, it should be noted, on which the multilateral regime is ambiguous.
The other key plank in China's position is that the multilateral regime and associated western pressure have focused excessively on exchange rate policy. Chinese officials have quite justifiably argued that global imbalances, and China's trade surplus 16 more specifically, have "structural" causes that go well beyond exchange rate issues.
These other factors include the marked differences in savings rates between countries like
China and the US; the relocation of manufacturing production by multinational companies away from other East Asian and many high income countries towards China;
and the role of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency. 29 Less mentioned by officials are a variety of Chinese policies that contribute to an excessive reliance on exports, including underpriced energy, land and other production inputs.
Why has China been so insistent on its right to manage the pace of RMB appreciation? Certainly, the promotion of exports has been an important policy priority that "China's economic growth is unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable." 30 In recognition of these drawbacks, the Chinese leadership stated in its 11 th five year plan its objective of "rebalancing" the economy towards domestic growth, higher consumption, and a balanced current account. Before the recent crisis, the share of consumption in total GDP fell to very low levels (about 35%); investment and output were increasingly dependent upon the willingness of foreigners to permit high import growth; the managed exchange rate made it more difficult for the central bank to manage inflation; excessive reserve accumulation increased China's dependence on US policy choices; 31 lending trillions of dollars to the United States was increasingly unpopular at home; and the economy was increasingly dependent upon commodity imports from distant and sometimes politically unstable countries. In March 2008, Wen asked officials to pay attention to global imbalances, foreign protectionism, and the effects of global financial turmoil, and said that the policy priority should be to reduce consumer price inflation. 32 The implication was that the export drive and an associated undervalued RMB was part of the problem. In the depths of the global crisis, when Beijing's main concern was to prevent a sharp collapse of growth and the concern with inflation evaporated, the authorities reverted to a policy of maintaining a fixed exchange rate against the dollar (figure 3).
Once growth seemed assured, the authorities returned to the policy of controlled, gradual appreciation against the US dollar. China is an outlier in the global political economy and that it poses a unique threat to this aspect of multilateralism? I argue in this section that China is unique in some respects but not in others. By contrast with Germany and Japan, China is even larger but still poor, highly dependent on foreign investment and technology, and not a strategic ally of the United States. On the other hand, China's insistence on considerable national policy autonomy in areas of perceived vital importance and domestic political sensitivity is broadly shared by all other major countries, including notably the United States.
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Furthermore, the multilateral regime itself has been systematically weakened and biased in its focus by years of western dominance, leaving it ill-equipped to deal not just with China's rise but that of emerging economies generally.
As noted already, many US critics saw the 2007 Decision on Bilateral
Surveillance as a necessary (if still inadequate) attempt to strengthen the IMF's hand in dealing with the problem of emerging market currency undervaluation, above all by China. From China's perspective, however, in spite of the Decision's emphasis on 'external stability' and its neutral phrasing, it reinforced the continuing regime bias towards external constraint on exchange rate policy and the lack of credible constraint on fiscal and monetary policies in the major advanced countries.
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The roots of this bias go back to the origins of the Bretton Woods system, when US and British negotiators agreed that the IMF should have little effective influence over national fiscal and monetary policy choices in non-borrowing countries. The Fund's annual Article IV consultations with major developed countries provided no serious constraint on macroeconomic policy choices for the latter, except in the unusual cases in which they were subject to loan conditionality (as with Britain and Italy in the late 1970s). The United States was especially unwilling to accept new external constraints upon its macroeconomic policy choices after the end of gold convertibility in the early 1970s, having viewed the end of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system as a kind of liberation. 41 Indeed, Washington had always viewed the multilateral regime as a means of constraining less well managed and less democratically legitimate countries; the Bretton Woods institutions were never seen as a legitimate source of external constraint over US policies. 42 Furthermore, in response to the inflationary episodes of the 1970s and 1980s, G7 countries and advanced countries generally focused on building domestic mechanisms of monetary policy constraint such as more independent central banks and inflation targeting strategies. 43 Fiscal policy meanwhile was driven largely by the shifting winds of domestic politics, the domestic business cycle, and (especially in the US case) by perceived strategic imperatives.
Such factors proved far more important in shaping macroeconomic policies in the advanced countries than the very episodic attempts at international policy coordination.
Since the mid-1970s, the G7 countries consistently chose to conduct macroeconomic policy discussions outside of the IMF framework in a more narrow, flexible and nonrules based 'minilateral' grouping. But even the G7 process was ineffective in coordinating macroeconomic policy given the growing power (and domestic orientation) of central banks and the dominance of domestic politics in fiscal policymaking.
Unsurprisingly, the G7 proved unable to prevent the emergence of persistent, large payments imbalances between its members. 44 Even the much-heralded Plaza and Louvre accords in the mid-1980s were primarily agreements on exchange rate intervention and affected fiscal and monetary policy marginally. In general, the G7 process underlined the unwillingness of the major countries to contemplate serious and binding macroeconomic successfully resisted IMF criticism. 46 Nor was the European Union sympathetic to any substantive IMF involvement internal EU macroeconomic policy discussions. 47 In the face of perceived G7 hypocrisy, the emerging market response was inevitably one of self-help. The Asian crisis of the late 1990s was pivotal in this respect for China and a number of its regional neighbours, many of whom built exceptionally large foreign exchange reserves in the years that followed so as to avoid any future need to borrow from the Fund. The irony is that by pursuing greater autonomy from the Fund by running large current account surpluses, these countries came under growing pressure to contribute to the reduction of global imbalances. From the emerging country perspective, this was highly unwelcome because they had no voice in the G7/8 process and were substantially underrepresented in a western-dominated IMF. In addition, as noted above, the IMF surveillance regime was focused on exchange rate policy, an aspect that constrained the policy choice of emerging countries without touching those of the major advanced countries. Unsurprisingly, many emerging countries, including China, became increasingly open in demanding that the IMF surveillance regime be rebalanced during the 2008-9 crisis. The Chinese central bank's Deputy Governor stated in March 2009 that "we feel that the IMF particularly needs to strengthen its surveillance of the economic and financial policies of the major reserve-currency-issuing nations". 48 In the midst of the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, it was clear that the multilateral regime on macroeconomic surveillance was not up to the task -but it had never really been so.
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4 Conclusion -towards a more effective multilateral regime?
In many ways much has changed since the global crisis began. The G7 has been replaced as the informal steering committee of the global economy by the G20; the voice and influence of emerging countries in the IMF has been increased, with more to come; the IMF has been given the task of elaborating the policy changes required to achieve a large and sustained reduction in global imbalances and of assessing country compliance with them; and the Fund has been much more vigorous in its criticism of major countries' policies, most notably those of the United States. Does all this amount to a substantial enhancement of the multilateral surveillance regime?
At the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, G20 leaders committed themselves to a "cooperative process of mutual assessment of our policy frameworks and the implications of those frameworks for the pattern and sustainability of global growth."
They also made a commitment to a strengthened process of multilateral review and consultation:
We ask the IMF to assist our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors The IMF executive board also agreed in October 2008 on a statement of surveillance priorities to guide surveillance through 2011, among which was a commitment to promote an "orderly reduction of global imbalances." 50 For its own part, the IMF acknowledged the past failures of surveillance and re-committed itself to be a "ruthless truth-teller" in the wake of the crisis. The IMF has produced a series of reports outlining in a concrete and balanced fashion what is required to achieve the G20's stated objective of a sustained reduction in global imbalances. 51 In its bilateral surveillance, the Fund has also been markedly more robust in its criticism of policies in major advanced countries, notably of the United States. in Washington over July-August 2011, it was also once again very evident that previous US commitments in the G20 process played little role in shaping the domestic debate.
Continued economic weakness also prompted the Federal Reserve to maintain an extraordinarily loose monetary policy, which was seen in many emerging countries as an 28 attempt to force exchange rate appreciation or inflation on them. Policy choices within the European Union and in Japan also remain almost entirely internally focused.
Meanwhile, in China, export surpluses and reserve accumulation have continued to grow rapidly and it is clear that achieving greater reliance on domestic consumer demand will take much longer. Many emerging countries also concluded that current account surpluses and large foreign exchange holdings provided good insurance in this latest global financial crisis. The IMF's own baseline projections on current account imbalances are for these to increase rapidly in absolute terms over the next five years (figure 1) and to return to historically high levels as a proportion of global GDP -which may indicate how much the Fund sees G20 rebalancing commitments as credible.
In the end, the G20, like the G7 before it, wishes to retain authority over implementation and peer review, which suggests continuing limits to the multilateral surveillance process. The G-20 may now have brought the major players into the multilateral consultation process, but larger numbers also means greater complexity.
Greater diversity and less commonality of values and political purpose are also likely to reduce prospects for policy cooperation. 53 Monetary, public spending and taxation issues ultimately remain far too politically sensitive for governments to negotiate in any international forum -the strong desire on the part of creditor countries even within the Eurozone to retain fiscal policy sovereignty have become all the more clear during the recent sovereign debt crisis. This in turn implies that we should expect little real change in the multilateral surveillance regime, which is likely to remain weak compared to the most important advanced and emerging countries. We are likely to be living with large global imbalances for some time to come. 
